Abuse of collective dominance under the competition law of the Russian Federation

In 2006, Russia amended its competition law and added the concepts of “collective dominance” and its abuse. This was seen as an attempt to address the common problem of “conscious parallelism” among firms in concentrated industries. Critics feared that the enforcement of this provision would become tantamount to government regulation of prices. In this paper we examine the enforcement experience to date, looking especially closely at sanctions imposed on firms in the oil industry. Some difficulties and complications experienced in enforcement are analyzed, and some alternative strategies for addressing anticompetitive behavior in concentrated industries discussed

External Relationship of Russian Corporations

stock holding company group, corporate governance, firm's boundaries, enterprise associations, institutions, state authorities, Russia, corporate finance, banking sector, ownership structure, corporate performance, managerial turnover

Concerted practice enforcement in Russia: How judicial review shapes the standards of evidence and number of enforcement targets

A judicial review of the infringement decisions of the competition authority substantially affects the standard of evidence in competition enforcement as well as the structure of cases that the competition authority takes. Enforcement against concerted practice in Russia represents a case-study of interaction between commercial courts of first instance, the Highest Court, the competition authority as enforcer, market participants and the legislator to influence the standards of liability under investigation of concerted practice. We examine the judicial review of infringement decisions on concerted practice and track the evolution of legal definition and sufficiency of evidence in such cases. We show, first, that in Russian enforcement, the ability of the Highest Court to influence the criteria of first instance courts is limited (in contrast to the ability of the first instance court to influence the strategy of enforcement by the competition authority). Second, the increase in the burden of proof motivates the competition authority to refrain from an investigation of concerted practice, in accordance with the prediction of the model of the selection of enforcement target by reputation-maximizing authority

Introduction of Leniency Programs for Cartel Participants: The Russian Case

Certain characteristics of competition policy in Russia still objectively hinder the effectiveness of the leniency program, even after recent changes. (Andrey Shastitko, Bureau of Economic Analysis, & Svetlana Avdasheva, National Research Univ., Higher School of Economics).